By Ronald W. McLeod
Industry underestimates the level to which behaviour at paintings is stimulated via the layout of the operating surroundings. Designing for Human Reliability argues that higher wisdom of the contribution of layout to human errors can considerably improve HSE functionality and enhance go back on funding. Illustrated with many examples, Designing for Human Reliability explores why paintings structures are designed and carried out such that "design-induced human mistakes" turns into more-or-less inevitable. McLeod demonstrates how good understood mental methods can lead humans to make judgements and to take activities that differently look most unlikely to appreciate. Designing for Human Reliability units out 13 key components to convey the degrees of human reliability anticipated to accomplish the go back on funding sought whilst judgements are made to speculate in tasks. And it demonstrates how research of the human contribution to incidents could be more suitable through targeting what businesses anticipated and meant once they selected to depend upon human functionality as a barrier, or keep watch over, opposed to incidents.
- Recognise a few ‘hard truths’ of human functionality and know about the significance of making use of the rules of Human elements Engineering on capital projects
- Learn from research of real-world incidents how transformations among ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ types of considering may end up in human errors in business processes
- Learn how controls and barrier opposed to significant incidents that depend on human functionality will be bolstered through the layout and improvement of resources and equipment
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Extra resources for Designing for Human Reliability: Human Factors Engineering in the Oil, Gas, and Process Industries
System 1 is always “on”—you cannot turn it “off”. System 2, in contrast, is slow, lazy and inefficient, but careful and rational. It takes conscious effort to turn it on. System 2 demands continuous attention. It is disrupted if attention is withdrawn. As well as a mistaken belief that he was at the right reactor, a bias towards confirmation and commitment to the plan of action, and a possible mistrust in the reliability of the switches, it also seems possible, if not likely, that the operator’s thoughts and actions in those critical moments would have been driven by the power of System 1 thinking.
Of course, I can’t answer those questions because I don’t know. But a little consideration, drawing on experience of many projects, is worthwhile. It seems likely to me that the answers to all three of these questions would be considered so obvious that they would not even be asked. Engineers working on capital projects are generally not aware of how commonly operators not only go to, but operate on, the wrong equipment. It is taken for granted that operators will identify the equipment they need to operate or work on using the labels and signage provided.
Crucial to the “cognitive now” are the individual’s experience and understanding of the state of the world in the preceding seconds and minutes, as well as expectations of what is likely to happen next based on longer-term experience and knowledge of the situation. So the first observation in seeking to try to understand why the Formosa operator may not have been aware of the risks associated with the action he was about to take is related to the psychology of risk awareness. There is an important difference between the real-time risk awareness that operators need to have—in the “cognitive now”— and the awareness of risk that can exist in the “back-office,” removed in time and space from the real-world activity.